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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge: 
 
Charles Torres appeals the eleven month sentence 
imposed on him under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines after pleading guilty to one count of bank fraud 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344. At sentencing, the 
government had requested a downwar d departure pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 based on Torr es's substantial 
assistance in a federal investigation of police corruption 
and illegal gambling enterprises in northern New Jersey. 
According to the government, which submitted a six-page 
letter to the District Court exhaustively detailing and 
commending Torres's assistance, the cooperation lasted for 
approximately five years and eventually r esulted in the 
criminal convictions of thirty individuals on char ges of 
racketeering, extortion, and obstruction of justice. The 
District Court granted the S 5K1.1 motion but, despite the 
government's presentation, chose to r educe Torres's 
sentence by only one month. 
 
In this appeal, Torres alleges that the District Court, 
when ruling upon the government's S 5K1.1 motion, 
committed a mistake of law or incorrectly applied the 
Guidelines in several ways. We reject these allegations of 
error, focusing with particular emphasis on Torres's 
contention that the Court failed to examine thefive 
sentencing factors listed in S 5K1.1 in a sufficiently 
thorough manner. Although we ultimately conclude that the 
District Court's examination was minimally adequate, and 
therefore reject this allegation of error, we stress that a 
sentencing court would be best served by car efully reciting 
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on the record the factors it consider ed and weighed in 
arriving at its downward departure decision. Finally, Torres 
further argues that the District Court err ed by failing to 
grant him a downward departure greater than the one 
month he received. With respect to this contention, we lack 
jurisdiction to review the District Court's discretionary 
decision to depart by only one month. See United States v. 
Khalil, 132 F.3d 897, 898 (3d Cir . 1997). 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the sentencing decision of the 
District Court. 
 
I. 
 
Torres's charge of bank fraud stems from his 
membership in the United Government Employees Federal 
Credit Union, a federally-chartered and insured financial 
institution in Union City, New Jersey. Torr es became a 
member of the credit union in 1987, and in April 1990, he 
began obtaining fraudulent loans. By February 1991, he 
had obtained eight fraudulent loans totaling mor e than 
$90,000. In his first application, for $21,026.45, he falsely 
represented his annual income as $50,000. The credit 
union approved the application. He obtained a second loan 
for $15,000 on May 30, 1990, after falsely r eporting an 
annual income of $75,000 and a $500,000 home. He 
obtained his third fraudulent loan ($20,000) by using the 
name of his business partner and failing to disclose his 
partner's outstanding debts. Less than a month later , 
Torres obtained a $5,000 line of cr edit by falsely reporting 
an income of $45,000. The credit union granted him a 
second line of credit for $5,000 on January 23, 1991, after 
he falsely reported an income of $50,000. T orres ultimately 
drew $9,000 against this credit extension. On February 25, 
1991, he used his sister's name and financial information 
to obtain a $6,000 loan; that same day, he r eceived another 
$6,000 loan by using his brother's name. The next day, 
Torres obtained his eighth and final loan ($15,000) from the 
credit union by using his wife's name. 
 
Torres pleaded guilty to bank fraud on March 31, 1995. 
Based on an offense level of fourteen and a criminal history 
category of II, the District Court sentenced him to twenty- 
 
                                3 
  
four months imprisonment and five years of supervised 
release. The court also ordered him to pay $30,000.00 in 
restitution and a $50.00 special assessment fee. Torres 
appealed this sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the District 
Court had abused its discretion by declining to reduce his 
offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 3E1.1. We agreed, vacated the sentence, and 
remanded the case for resentencing. See U.S. v. Torres, No. 
95-5831, (3d Cir. July 8, 1996). 
 
Upon remand, the District Court granted the parties' 
joint requests for a continuance to allow T orres to 
cooperate in a federal investigation of police corruption 
involving illegal gambling enterprises in Union City, West 
New York, and several other northern New Jersey cities. On 
February 25, 2000, the District Court held a r esentencing 
hearing. The Court granted a two-level downwar d departure 
for acceptance of responsibility, lowering T orres's offense 
level from fourteen to twelve and his range of incarceration 
from eighteen to twenty-four months to twelve to eighteen 
months. 
 
In addition, the government requested a downward 
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1 for Torres's 
substantial assistance. During the hearing and in its letter 
brief to the Court, the government str ongly recommended 
that Torres's sentence be reduced to probation. In the six- 
page letter brief, which comprehensively detailed the 
assistance that Torres had furnished, the government 
reported that Torres had "worked diligently and aggressively 
to provide genuine and ultimately very helpful assistance" 
in its investigation of police corruption involving illegal 
gambling enterprises. J.A. at 75. Torr es's cooperation had 
lasted for approximately five years, during which time 
Torres had helped to assemble crucial evidence by 
developing relationships with key players in the conspiracy 
and then tape-recording their inculpatory conversations. 
These efforts contributed significantly to obtaining an 
indictment and guilty plea from at least one Union City 
officer and furthered the investigation of police corruption 
that resulted in the indictment and prosecution of nine 
police officers and seven others on charges of racketeering, 
conspiracy, extortion, and bribery. See id. at 76. In sum, 
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the federal investigation yielded more than thirty 
convictions for racketeering, extortion, obstruction of 
justice, and other related offenses. 1 See id. at 77. Because 
of Torres's key role in the securing of these convictions, the 
government's letter, in various places, characterized 
Torres's assistance as "substantial and important," "vital," 
"diligent[ ] and aggressive,""very helpful," "extraordinary," 
"pro-active," "tremendously significant," "immensely 
significant," and of "enormous benefit." Id. at 72-76. 
 
Torres's attorney also argued in favor of the government's 
motion and recommended the imposition of a pr obationary 
sentence. He emphasized that Torres pr ovided 
"extraordinary assistance to the gover nment" during a five 
year time-period and helped obtain thirty convictions. 
Specifically, he noted that Torres had tape-recorded up to 
sixty-five conversations, reviewed transcripts of those 
conversations, appeared before the grand jury on numerous 
occasions, and agreed to testify whenever asked to do so. 
Moreover, as a result of his extensive cooperation, Torres 
was threatened and his family suffer ed. Id. at 91-99. 
 
The District Court granted the S 5K1.1 motion but, 
despite the presentations made by both the government 
and Torres's attorney, chose to depart downward only one 
month below the applicable twelve to eighteen month 
Guideline range, sentencing Torres to twelve months 
incarceration. The District Court enter ed its judgment of 
sentence on March 17, 2000, and this timely appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 
On appeal, Torres presents four ar guments. First, he 
contends that in determining the extent of his sentencing 
reduction for substantial assistance, the District Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The government, however, also noted that Torres's assistance was 
untimely in certain respects. For example, by the time Torres agreed to 
provide crucial assistance in the investigation of a Union City Police 
Department captain, he had died. Therefor e, the government concluded 
that "Torres's hesitance to pr ovide candid and complete cooperation at 
the outset resulted in useless delay and lost opportunities that are now 
impossible to calculate." J.A. at 77. 
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erred by failing to examine and weigh S 5K1.1's enumerated 
factors in a sufficiently thorough manner . Second, he 
argues that the District Court erred by announcing his 
sentencing reduction in terms of months rather than 
offense levels. Third, he contends that the sentencing judge 
misunderstood the proper legal standard for granting 
downward departures under S 5K1.1. Finally, he argues 
that the District Court erred by granting him too small a 
downward departure under S 5K1.1. 
 
Torres's first three arguments allege sentencing errors 
based upon a mistake of law or an incorrect application of 
the Guidelines. Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction and 
review these claims under a plenary standar d. See United 
States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155, 160 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992). 
In contrast, we lack jurisdiction to review the extent of a 
District Court's discretionary downward departure for 
substantial assistance to the government. See United States 
v. Parker, 902 F.2d 221, 222 (3d Cir . 1990). 
 
A. 
 
1. 
 
Torres first argues that the District Court erred in 
determining the extent of a downward departure for his 
substantial assistance to the government by failing to 
conduct an adequate assessment of S 5K1.1'sfive 
enumerated factors. During oral argument, T orres conceded 
that the court considered each of the factors before 
announcing its ruling, but now argues that its examination 
was superficial, covering only the "basics." He contends 
that such a cursory analysis, with minimal articulation, 
fails under our standard, which requir es a qualitative, fact- 
specific assessment of a defendant's substantial assistance. 
Thus, he believes his sentence should be vacated. 
 
Torres's first argument r equires us to examine the 
responsibility of a District Court judge when considering a 
S 5K1.1 motion for downward departur e based on 
substantial assistance. Our analysis begins withS 3553 of 
the Sentencing Reform Act, which describes the obligations 
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of the court when imposing a sentence under the 
Guidelines. Section 3553(c) provides: 
 
       (c) Statement of reasons for imposing sentence. The 
       court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open 
       court the reasons for its imposition of the particular 
       sentence, and if the sentence-- 
 
       (1) is of the kind, and within the range, described in 
       subsection (a)(4) and that range exceeds 24 months, 
       the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular 
       point within the range; or 
 
       (2) is not of the kind or is outside the range, described 
       in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason for the 
       imposition of a sentence different fr om that described. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3553(c). 
 
Thus, under S 3553(c), a sentencing judge must explain 
his or her reasons for imposing a particular sentence. 
Further, when a sentence is outside the Guidelines range, 
S 3553(c)(2) adds an additional obligation. It requires a 
sentencing judge to justify explicitly his or her decision to 
depart. Reducing a sentence under S 5K1.1 falls under 
S 3553(c)(2)'s more stringent provision, because it permits a 
sentencing judge to depart from the Guidelines range based 
upon a defendant's substantial assistance. 
 
Both the language of S 5K1.1 and its Backgr ound 
Commentary reflect S 3553(c)'s command. In its 1999 form,2 
S 5K1.1 provides: 
 
       Upon motion of the government stating that the 
       defendant has provided substantial assistance in the 
       investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
       committed an offense, the court may depart fr om the 
       guidelines. 
 
       (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the 1995 Guidelines applied to T orres's initial sentencing, 
the 1999 Guidelines were in effect at time of his resentencing and, thus, 
govern this appeal. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 1B1.11 
(1999) (dictating that the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time 
of sentencing is to be used). 
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       the court for reasons stated that may include, but are 
       not limited to, consideration of the following: 
 
       (1) the court's evaluation of the significance and 
       usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into 
       consideration the government's evaluation of the 
       assistance rendered; 
 
       (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of 
       any information or testimony provided by the 
       defendant; 
 
       (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; 
 
       (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury 
       to the defendant or his family resulting fr om his 
       assistance; 
 
       (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. 
 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 5K1.1 (1999). 
 
Similar to S 3553(c), subsection (a) of S 5K1.1 requires a 
sentencing judge to state his or her reasons for reducing a 
sentence. Section 5K1.1, however, extendsS 3553(c) and 
includes a list of relevant factors for measuring substantial 
assistance and determining the extent of a r eduction. 
Section 5K1.1, however, does not explicitly r equire the 
consideration of these factors. Instead, it pr ovides "[t]he 
appropriate reduction shall be deter mined by the court for 
reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, 
consideration of the following." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, 
a sentencing judge is not confined to S 5K1.1's enumerated 
factors. However, it requires a sentencing judge to provide 
a specific statement explaining what factors he or she 
applied and the role these factors played in the sentencing 
determination. 
 
Section 5K1.1's Background Commentary also r equires a 
District Court to state its reasons for departing from the 
Guidelines for substantial assistance. The Commentary 
provides that "[t]he nature, extent, and significance of 
assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that 
must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis. 
Latitude is, therefore, affor ded the sentencing judge to 
reduce a sentence based upon the variable r elevant factors, 
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including those listed above." Id. at cmt. background. Citing 
to S 3553(c), the Commentary continues, "[t]he sentencing 
judge must, however, state the r easons for reducing a 
sentence under this section." Id. (emphasis added). 
Therefore, S 5K1.1's Background Commentary emphasizes 
the requirement that a District Court conduct an 
individual, fact-specific analysis when deter mining the 
extent of a defendant's substantial assistance. Mor eover, it 
highlights the District Court's obligation to communicate 
that analysis to the respective parties. 
 
In addition to the Sentencing Reform Act and the 
Guidelines, our case law requires an individualized, 
qualitative analysis within and outside the context of 
S 5K1.1. For example, in United States v. Thompson, 483 
F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973), a judge announced that he 
sentenced all those convicted of violations of Selective 
Service law to at least thirty months in jail no matter how 
"good they were." We held that it was impermissible for a 
sentencing judge to employ a personal "sentencing policy." 
We reasoned that "[a] fixed view as to sentencing is 
inconsistent with the discretion vested in the trial judge 
that he may fulfill his mandate to tailor the sentence 
imposed to the circumstances surrounding each individual 
defendant and frustrates the operation of those rules set up 
to effect such a result." Id. at 529. More recently, in United 
States v. King, 52 F.3d 589, 591 (3d Cir . 1995), we rejected 
a District Court's use of a mechanical "sentencing practice." 
We held that in making downward departur es under 
S 5K1.1, a District Court must undertake an individualized, 
case-by-case consideration of the extent and quality of a 
defendant's cooperation. 
 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also examined the 
duty of a sentencing judge when considering a departure 
for substantial assistance under S 5K1.1. In United States v. 
Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150 (1st Cir. 1993), the appellants 
argued that the District Court had confused the legal 
principles governing departures underS 5K1.1 and S 5K2.0. 
The Court of Appeals agreed. In order to determine whether 
the District Court's error was harmless, it examined the 
proper standard under S 5K1.1. In so doing, the Court of 
Appeals initially noted that a district court has wide 
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discretion in deciding whether to depart underS 5K1.1. 
However, it held that S 5K1.1's r elevant factors "should be 
considered the mother lode of substantial assistance 
inquiries." Id. at 1156. As such, the court instructed that 
"[a] district court, faced with a section 5K1.1 motion, must 
at a bare minimum indicate its cognizance of these factors." 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
We agree with the approach taken in the First Circuit. 
Thus, we hold that when considering a departur e for 
substantial assistance, a sentencing court not only must 
conduct a qualitative, case-by-case analysis but also must 
examine S 5K1.1's enumerated factors. That is, when 
presented with a motion for downward departure a 
sentencing judge must, at the very minimum, indicate his 
or her consideration of S 5K1.1's five factors in determining 
whether and to what extent to grant a sentencing 
reduction. Further, a sentencing judge must indicate his or 
her consideration of any factors outside those listed in 
S 5K1.1. We strongly urge sentencing judges to make 
specific findings regarding each factor and articulate 
thoroughly whether and how they used any pr offered 
evidence to reach their decision. In sum, it is incumbent 
upon a sentencing judge not only to conduct an 
individualized examination of the defendant's substantial 
assistance, but also to acknowledge S 5K1.1's factors in his 
or her analysis. 
 
This holding not only comports with the specificity 
requirements of S 5K1.1 but also r ecognizes the 
considerable responsibility of a sentencing judge. As we 
stated in United States v. Faulks, 201 F .3d 208, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2000), "the responsibility confr onting a district court 
judge when he or she sentences a convicted defendant is an 
awesome one." In that case, we held that in or der to ensure 
fairness, a judge must render a sentence in the defendant's 
presence. See id. We reasoned that it was not unlikely that 
a judge may enter court with an abstract attitude about the 
appropriate sentence, only to alter that mind-set when 
faced with a live human being in open court. Accor dingly, 
imposing a sentence merely by written judgment is 
forbidden. See id. 
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Requiring district courts to consider S 5K1.1's delineated 
factors similarly ensures that a sentencing judge is meeting 
his or her solemn duties in the most responsible way 
possible. Specifically, this requirement assures that a 
sentencing decision is made with solicitude, because it 
"encourages the judge to clarify and justify, in his own 
mind, the grounds for the sentence he chooses." United 
States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1134 (3d Cir. 1977) 
(Adams, J., concurring). Hence, it ensures that a 
sentencing decision is made fairly. Of course, fair ness is 
enhanced as a sentencing judge's analysis incr eases in 
detail and thoroughness. This careful appr oach is essential 
where even minor differences in the length of a sentence of 
confinement can have an enormous impact on a defendant. 
 
Moreover, justifying a sentencing decision by including a 
discussion of S 5K1.1's factors reinfor ces the dignity of the 
accused. It acknowledges that he or she is worthy of such 
an explanation. See id. at 1134. In many cases this 
requirement may be of "therapeutic worth to a defendant." 
Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 456 (1974) 
(Marshall, J., concurring). Therefore, it serves an important 
function in the criminal justice system. 
 
It is important to note, however, that our holding today in 
no way prevents a sentencing judge from considering 
factors beyond S 5K1.1's enumerated list. Such a holding 
would contravene both the very language of S 5K1.1 and 
our jurisprudence. Indeed, we encourage district courts to 
consider all relevant facts and factors in r eaching their 
decisions. The preface to S 5K1.1's enumerated list states 
that "[t]he appropriate reduction shall be determined by the 
court for reasons that may include, but ar e not limited to, 
consideration of the following . . . ." U.S. S ENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL S 5K1.1 (1999). In addition, S 5K1.1's 
Background Commentary provides that "[l]atitude is, 
therefore, afforded a sentencing judge to reduce a sentence 
based upon variable relevant factors, including those listed 
above." Id. at cmt. background. Consistent with this 
language, in United States v. Casiano, 113 F .3d 420, 428 
(3d Cir. 1997), we stated that "the bases for substantial 
assistance departures are not meant to be exhaustive, they 
are instructive." Thus, we held that a district court's 
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consideration of the "seriousness of the crime" and the 
"impact on the victim" in determining the extent of a 
departure under S 5K1.1 was well within its discretion. See 
id. at 431. 
 
Other Courts of Appeals have similarly interpr eted 
S 5K1.1. For example, in United States v. Carnes, 945 F.2d 
1013, 1014 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Cir cuit Court of 
Appeals held that a district could weigh the assistance 
rendered by the defendant, convicted inter alia of using a 
firearm during a drug trafficking of fense, against the 
benefit he received from the prosecution's decision not to 
charge him with the use of additional weapons. 
Additionally, in United States v. Mittelstadt , 969 F.2d 335, 
336-37 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Cir cuit Court of 
Appeals held that a district court did not err in considering 
a defendant's chronic alcoholism in making aS 5K1.1 
determination. See also United States v. Luiz, 102 F.3d 466 
(11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that a district court's 
comparison of a defendant's conduct to that of co- 
defendants to determine the extent of a sentencing 
reduction for substantial assistance was not a 
misapplication of S 5K1.1); United States v. Alvarez, 51 F.3d 
36, 41 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he decision as to the extent of the 
departure is committed to the almost complete discretion of 
the district court, which may consider factors beyond the 
narrower set that could independently support a departure 
in the first instance."); Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156-57 ("Even 
if the five factors enumerated in section 5K1.1 weigh in a 
defendant's favor, the district court may, on the basis of 
other considerations . . . decide to forego or curtail a 
downward departure for substantial assistance."). 
 
Applying this standard to the present case, we conclude 
that the District Court, although marginally, met its burden 
under S 5K1.1. The transcripts of the sentencing hearing 
reveal that the Court heard and consider ed arguments that 
covered each factor enumerated in the Guidelines, and 
apparently read the government's letter. Although the Court 
failed to articulate the details of Torr es's substantial 
assistance when announcing its ruling, we ar e satisfied 
that it weighed S 5K1.1's factors nonetheless. Specifically, 
the Court stated, "[t]he motion for S 5K1.1 is granted. It's 
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barely granted, but we will grant it because of the effusive 
recommendation for such being made by the United States 
Attorney arising out of what appeared to be a successful 
investigation and prosecution of law enfor cement officers 
. . . ." J.A. at 99. Therefore, the court indicated its 
awareness of Torres's assistance in relation to the S 5K1.1 
factors.3 
 
The transcript also reveals that the District Court 
balanced the seriousness of Torres's of fense against his 
substantial efforts to assist the gover nment's investigation. 
The Court stated: 
 
       We have heard what he has said. W e have heard what 
       his attorney has said with regard to this apparent 
       rehabilitation of Mr. Torr es. However, it remains that 
       Mr. Torres, nevertheless, committed a serious crime in 
       1991 and for that he should be punished. 
 
       Now, the extent of punishment can readily be tempered 
       by the grant, which I do, of the motion 5K1.1. But, I'm 
       not placing him on probation because what he did 
       cannot just be forgotten or erased or made to 
       disappear because of the subsequent cooperation with 
       the Government, nevertheless, even though, according 
       to the Government, it was fruitful. 
 
Id. at 99-100. As we indicated earlier , this sort of balancing 
is entirely proper and well within a district court's 
discretion. 
 
Although we conclude that the District Court's 
consideration of the S 5K1.1 factors is adequate, we cannot 
help but observe that it is minimally so. As noted above, 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(c), U.S.S.G. S 5K1.1, and the background 
commentary and case law interpreting them, impose a 
weighty obligation on a sentencing judge to articulate the 
reasons for a particular downward departur e. This 
obligation assumes even greater vitality in situations, like 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note, however, that in the absence of the oral colloquy immediately 
prior to the District Court's ruling, the District Court's remarks would 
fall well short of our requirement that a sentencing judge weigh and 
discuss S 5K1.1's factors when presented with a motion for substantial 
assistance. 
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Torres's, where the magnitude of the departure and the 
extent of the cooperation may, at first blush, appear 
incongruous. The District Court chose to depart downward 
by only one month from the twelve to eighteen month 
Guideline range applicable to Torres, in spite of the 
government's letter brief forcefully commending his 
cooperation, which during its five-year duration ultimately 
helped to net thirty criminal convictions, and in spite of 
Torres's attorney's description of the threats Torres and his 
family suffered as a consequence of his assistance. Section 
5K1.1 indicates that a court should account, inter alia, for 
"the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance," "the 
timeliness of the defendant's assistance," and"the 
government's evaluation of the assistance r endered" in 
making its departure decision, and should articulate the 
ways in which it considered those factors. Although we 
conclude that, in Torres's case, the District Court's 
consideration was minimally sufficient, we also stress that 
a sentencing court would be best served by car efully 
reciting on the record the factors it evaluated in arriving at 
its S 5K1.1 departure decision, and the manner in which it 
weighed those factors. 
 
2. 
 
Torres further argues that the District Court employed a 
"sentencing practice." In support, he points to the following 
comments by the District Court: 
 
       How much should be given for one who admittedly is 
       a criminal? How much consideration does the 
       Government want me to give to one who is admittedly 
       a criminal? 
 
       . . . . 
 
       You see the thing is, you have to for give me, I'm 
       somewhat cynical after all these years of epiphanies 
       that people obtain and have after they have been found 
       guilty of a crime. 
 
J.A. at 87-88. 
 
Like Torres, we are troubled by these remarks. They 
appear to evidence a bias against rewar ding defendants for 
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substantial assistance under S 5K1.1, and convey 
misgivings about defendants' cooperation, irr espective of 
the nature and degree of their assistance. Every party to 
every court proceeding has the right to an impartial 
determination of his or her rights. Cynicism, even if self- 
confessed, has no place in the courtroom. 
 
The District Court's statement, moreover , is wrong. The 
very purpose of a S 5K1.1 motion is to lower the sentence 
of "one who is admittedly a criminal." Congr ess specifically 
directed the Sentencing Commission to 
 
       assure that the guidelines reflect the general 
       appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence  than 
       would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account 
       a defendant's substantial assistance in the 
       investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
       committed an offense. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 994(n) (1998) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress 
has deemed a convicted defendant's meaningful assistance 
in the administration of justice between appr ehension and 
sentencing worthy of an adjustment in his or her sentence. 
Section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines reflects this judgment. 
 
Accordingly, the fact that a defendant "is admittedly a 
criminal" has no bearing on whether a S 5K1.1 motion is 
granted or denied. We must remember that at this point in 
the proceedings (sentencing), all defendants are criminals. 
A sentencing judge's own aversion to lowering the sentence 
of a convicted defendant for substantial assistance is 
simply irrelevant. Like it or not, the Guidelines not only 
permit a defendant's assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense, but encourage it. It is the obligation of a sentencing 
court to apply S 5K1.1 with this in mind. W e believe the 
District Court came perilously close to violating this 
obligation. 
 
Despite these comments, however, we ar e convinced that 
the District Court's decision relied upon valid grounds 
rather than its personal predilections. W e find no error 
because the Court considered the factors enumerated in 
S 5K1.1 as well as other relevant cir cumstances. Indeed, at 
no point did the sentencing judge state that it was"his 
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practice" to depart downward one month for substantial 
assistance. Cf. King, 53 F.3d at 590-91. Rather, he weighed 
the seriousness of Torres's offense against the government's 
detailed presentation of his conduct in r elation to S 5K1.1. 
This examination and discussion belies Torr es's contention 
that the sentencing judge employed a sentencing practice, 
rather than engaging in a qualitative, case-by-case analysis. 
Accordingly, we find no error with the District Court's 
analysis or enunciation of its basis for granting T orres a 
one month reduction in his sentence for substantial 
assistance to the government in its investigation of an 
illegal gambling enterprise. 
 
B. 
 
Torres also argues that the District Court improperly 
applied the Guidelines when it announced the extent of his 
departure in terms of months rather than offense levels. 
Further, he argues that the District Court misunderstood 
the legal standard for imparting a sentencing r eduction 
under S 5K1.1 and thus applied it impr operly and in 
violation of the law. We reject both of these arguments. 
 
With respect to Torres's contention that the District 
Court committed a legal error by not announcing its 
sentencing reduction in terms of of fense levels, neither the 
Sentencing Reform Act nor the Guidelines contain such a 
requirement. Here, the District Court reduced Torres's 
sentence by one month. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 
a departure measured in months is easily translated into 
offense levels. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3, 
pt. A (1999). Accordingly, the District Court's failure to 
announce Torres's reduction in ter ms of offense levels was 
not a legal error. 
 
Torres also argues that the District Court misunderstood 
the legal standard for imposing a S 5K1.1 downward 
departure for substantial assistance and thus imposed the 
standard in violation of the law. Torr es bases this argument 
on a single statement by the District Court at sentencing. 
Specifically, he focuses on the statement, "[a]nd that 
explains to you, Mr. Torres, why I believe you should be 
sentenced to jail and I do sentence you to jail because we 
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have granted you a departure." J.A. at 100 (emphasis 
added). Torres argues that this statement reflects the 
District Court's erroneous belief that it was r equired to 
sentence him to jail because it granted him a downward 
departure under S 5K1.1. 
 
When read in its entirety, the recor d of the sentencing 
hearing provides adequate assurance that the sentencing 
judge properly understood his authority underS 5K1.1, and 
recognized he could sentence Torr es to probation rather 
than jail. For example, prior to the statement at issue, the 
sentencing judge stated: "[n]ow the extent of the 
punishment can readily be tempered by the grant, which I 
do, of the motion 5K1.1. But I am not placing him on 
probation. By no stretch of the imagination am I placing 
him on probation because what he did cannot just be 
forgotten . . . because of subsequent cooperation with the 
Government . . . ." Id. at 100. These remarks make clear 
that the court was fully aware of its legal authority to 
impose a probationary sentence, but declined to do so 
because of the seriousness of Torres's of fense. This decision 
was within the discretion of the District Court and did not 
constitute error. As such, Torr es's argument fails. 
 
C. 
 
Finally, Torres argues that the District Court erred by not 
granting him a more significant downwar d departure. While 
we surely appreciate the reason for this grievance, we do 
not, however, have appellate jurisdiction with respect to 
this issue. 
 
A defendant may only appeal his sentence if it (1) was 
imposed in violation of law, (2) was imposed as a r esult of 
an incorrect application of the Guidelines, (3) is greater 
than that specified in the applicable Guideline range, or (4) 
was imposed when there is no applicable guideline and is 
plainly unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a). Thus, where the 
sentence was lawfully imposed and is within the applicable 
Guideline range, we lack jurisdiction to review the 
sentence. See United States v. Graham, 72 F .3d 352, 358 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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Here, Torres's challenge does not raise any of the above 
bases for appealing his sentence. Rather, he is merely 
attacking the extent of a lawfully imposed sentence. 
Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to review this 
issue. 
 
III. 
 
In summary, we hold that in determining the extent of a 
downward departure for substantial assistance, a 
sentencing judge must not only conduct a qualitative, fact- 
specific analysis but also must expressly indicate its 
recognition of S  5K1.1's factors. W e hold that the District 
Court minimally satisfied this standard by considering the 
government's extensive presentation of T orres's substantial 
assistance, which addressed each of S 5K1.1's five factors. 
Torres's additional allegations of err or are without merit, 
and we are without jurisdiction to review the District 
Court's decision to depart by only one month. Accor dingly, 
we affirm. 
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